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1 Introduction 
1.1 Increased reliance on wireless networks 
Wireless networks are quickly becoming more and more commonplace. They are 
used in universities, airports, restaurants, corporations, and even across entire cities, just to 
give a few examples. The ability to connect to a wireless network makes mobile computing 
a lot more viable and enjoyable. This combination of mobility and wireless connectivity 
allows users to work and play together while on the move. These days, users enjoy a lot 
more flexibility in regard to where and when they can compute with this setup than in the 
past. However, the benefit of wireless mobile computing does not come without a few risks. 
Users are a lot more vulnerable when computing wirelessly; if they are mobile as 
well, they will often be switching between networks, Increasing the likelihood of being 
attacked by exposing themselves to a larger number of users who may be malicious. 
Computers on a wireless network may be subjected to packet sniffers, routing attacks, denial 
of service attacks, worms, spyware, and other attacks that malicious users have devised. It is 
for this reason that intrusion detection cannot be developed with only wired, static networks 
in mind. 
1.2 Fundamental differences in wired vs. wireless intrusion 
detection 
There are a few key differences between intrusion detection systems (IDS) designed 
for wireless networks and those designed for wired networks. These differences illustrate 
that intrusion detection systems that have been designed in the past with wired networks in 
mind are not sufficient by themselves for wireless networks. 
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1.2.1 Attacks may come from any direction 
In a wired network, outside attacks will most often be forced to pass through a 
chokepoint. This chokepoint may consist of a firewall and some kind of demilitarized zone 
setup. Attackers must get malicious packets through this chokepoint, past all the software 
scanning for virii, worms, and exploits. The attacks may also be filtered out by having the 
firewall ignore packets sent to certain ports. The hope is that by the time the packets reach 
the internal network, all the malicious packets will have been removed from the incoming 
data. This kind of setup is often appropriate for most networks because gaining physical 
access to conduct an attack from the inside may be difficult. 
There are two broad categories of intrusion detection systems. Network-based 
intrusion detection systems try to capture data from a network at a centralized point. An 
example of this could be a gateway or router on a wired network; if an intrusion detection 
system was set up at this point, it would have access to all the packets going through that 
gateway. If you can monitor all the traffic on the network from one location, there wouldn't 
be much of a need to capture network data on each individual machine on a wired network, 
which leads into the other type of intrusion detection systems. Host-based intrusion detection 
systems are useful when there is no central point to capture all network data. These types of 
intrusion detection systems are also useful when monitoring process-specific statistics, such 
as system calls or CPU usage. The question is which is appropriate for wireless networks? 
Attempting to filter all outside access through one node, in most cases, will not work. 
Attacks can come from any direction, because attackers will be able to acquire high powered 
transmitters in order to reach their target node. If the building that contains the wireless 
network is not shielded, the attacker can simply deliver their malicious packets straight to the 
node they wish to attack without having to pass through any central chokepoint. Now if an 
intrusion detection system designed for a wired network was used on a wireless network 
under attack in this fashion, it probably wouldn't detect the attack. The node receiving 
packets directly from an attacker would likely have little or no intrusion detection system in 
place to detect these malicious packets. Since attacks may come from any direction and be 
directed toward- any node on the wireless network, it will be essential to include some kind of 
host-based intrusion detection system for each node on a wireless network. 
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Another type of attack that both wired and wireless networks are susceptible to is an 
attack from within. An attacker will hijack a node and use it to launch attacks against the 
network from a node already authenticated and transmitting/receiving packets on the 
network. To hijack a node in a wired network, an attacker will most likely have to gain 
physical access to the target machines. In a mobile wireless network, the nodes would be 
moving around. This mobility could lead to a node wandering into an unsafe zone, leading to 
the machine being captured or hijacked. For this reason, mobile wireless networks are seen 
as more likely to contain hijacked nodes. Again, this type of attack emphasizes the need for 
an intrusion detection system that. is host-based: ghost-based IDS would be able to detect and 
initiate a response to an attack from within the network. Atypical response might be to 
ignore further packets from a node determined to be malicious or to exclude that node from 
the network through other means, possibly re-keying if authentication is based upon keys. 
1.2.2 Wireless networks vulnerable to more types of attacks 
Another difference between wired and wireless networks is the number of attacks 
each type of network could face. Current intrusion detection systems designed for wired 
networks do not take into account wireless-specific attacks. These attacks include, for 
example, an attacker trying to discover the SSID of a hidden network, using 
disassociation/deauthentication broadcasts, and using malformed packets to crash wireless 
access points. If an IDS cannot detect these types of attacks, it will not be able to effectively 
detect all attacks on a wireless network. 
1.2.3 Decision making may need to be decentralized and cooperative 
If one node detects an attack from another node, it is essential to the security of the 
network that as many nodes as possible find out about the compromised node; if a 
compromised node is free to make as many attacks as possible on the network, eventually it 
may succeed. For this reason, intrusion detection system should be cooperative. Nodes 
should be able to share information collected locally with other nodes and work together to 
decide which nodes are malicious. 
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1.3 The need for multilevel detection and data correlation 
Information gathering done by each node should be carried out on multiple levels. 
An attack may work against a routing protocol, which can be detected by monitoring the 
network traffic. However, a different type of attack may exploit a buffer overflow in a 
running service on a node. This type of attack can be detected by watching for specific 
patterns of data in packets or it can be detected by monitoring what is happening in the 
operating system. The best IDS would monitor malicious activity on both levels in this case. 
For example, the intrusion detection system may not contain a pattern for the latest buffer 
overflow exploit, so the malicious packet could slip by the network-level monitoring part of 
the IDS; the operating system-level monitoring part would catch it when it noticed something 
unusual taking place in the process being exploited by the buffer overflow. 
1.4 Misuse vs. anomaly-based detection 
Another consideration for designing intrusion detection systems is whether to use 
misuse-based or anomaly-based detection. A mix of the two could also be appropriate in 
some circumstances. Misuse-based detection relies on signatures or patterns to detect 
attacks. A certain collection of bytes in a certain order is an example of something that could 
be searched for in each incoming packet. If the correct byte string is seen in a packet, it is 
flagged as a possible intrusion because the pattern belongs to a certain type of attack. Anti-
virus software works using misuse-based detection. Anomaly-based detection systems use a 
profile to analyze large amounts of data. Anomaly-based detection usually requires a notrrlal 
profile to be built beforehand, in order to compare the real data with it to decide whether or 
not there is an intrusion. So if a computer was running a web browser, a profile of all the 
system calls made by that web browser could be created while it is running under normal 
circumstances. The anomaly-based detection system would then compare real system calls 
made by the web browser while it is being used in a live situation with the profile it built. If 
the system calls and the order the system calls are made deviate too far from the normal 
profile, then an alert would be produced. The question of which type of detection is best for 
wireless networks has been researched previously and will be discussed in this paper. 
As you can see, there is a need for cooperative, multilevel, host-based intrusion 
detection systems designed specifically for wireless networks. This is why we have decided 
to investigate further into this area of research. We have designed a multilevel, host-based 
intrusion detection system which we will describe in detail after presenting our survey of 
existing wireless intrusion detection systems. 
1.5 Motivation and contributions 
With the increased reliance on wireless networks, fundamental differences between 
wired and wireless intrusion detection systems, and the need for multilevel detection, we feel 
that it is necessary to research wireless intrusion detection systems further. We provide a 
survey of existing open source and commercial wireless intrusion detection systems. We 
also design and test our own host-based, multilevel, distributed wireless intrusion detection 
system. The specific configuration we use for our IDS can be generalized into a more useful 
framework, which we describe. Points to consider when designing computer worms for use 
in testing intrusion detection systems are also included. 
1.6 Road map 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we show some of the 
related work in wireless intrusion detection systems. Chapter 3 describes the system design 
of our wireless intrusion detection system. Chapter 4 presents the implementation. Testing 
results are shown in chapter 5. Chapter 6 includes the discussion, conclusion, and future 
work sections. Acknowledgements and references are included at the end. 
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2 Previous and related work 
The first portion of the paper will describe our findings after studying current 
research papers concerned with wireless intrusion detection. We will also present 
commercial and open-source solutions for wireless intrusion detection. 
2.1 Research papers 
There has been some research and development into wireless intrusion detection 
systems. Specifically, [ 1 ] has developed a cooperative, multilevel, host-based intrusion 
detection system. They define many of the problems facing wireless intrusion detection as 
opposed to wired intrusion detection as mentioned in the introduction. The research group 
notes that there are many attacks specific to wireless networks, and that each node must be 
prepared to defend itself, mobile nodes are more likely to be captured, compromised nodes 
attacking from within a network can be devastating, nodes must be able to distrust peers, and 
decision making may be decentralized which could lead to the network being vulnerable to 
other types of attacks. 
They state that intrusion detection must be cooperative and host-based because there 
is no central point to collect all the network data from. The data that each node gathers must 
be distributed to its neighbors in order to build a larger picture of the network and 
corroborate attack data to get a higher confidence in the alerts they create. They point out 
that using multilevel detection is necessary in order to identify different types of attacks such 
as .buffer overflows in the application layer and flooding in the network layer. 
Communication between the detection levels will increase the likelihood of detecting attacks. 
They simulated an IDS using misuse and anomaly-based detection. Anomaly-based 
detection resulted in higher performance for their IDS simulation. This research group has 
provided an extremely useful foundation for designing wireless intrusion detection systems. 
We kept the key points from this paper in mind when designing our wireless intrusion 
detection system.. Our system is host-based, it uses multilevel detection, but it currently uses 
misuse-based detection. It can be modified to use a combination of both by building a 
normal profile of the CPU, memory, and hard disk usage by key processes, as well as the 
system calls they make. 
[2] discusses modifying an access point for increased security. The techniques they 
use on their access point include preventing NetStumbler from finding their network, using 
AirSnort decoys, and sending out fake responses to probes, helping to keep their network 
hidden. They also suggest having the access points monitor the MAC addresses of nodes 
attempting to join the network. If a MAC address is found to be blacklisted, then the access 
point can simply prevent the node using that MAC from joining the network. Another 
suggestion using the MAC address is to send a Request To Send (RTS) frame to a possible 
intruder's MAC address; the hope is that the node will respond with a Clear To Send (CTS) 
even though it was supposed to be listening passively. This would bring the attacker out into 
the open and allow it to be detected. 
The research team investigated possible intrusion response systems as well as 
intrusion detection methods. One method they adopted was exploiting a vulnerability in a 
common implementation of the 802.1 lb protocol to prevent machines from transmitting 
wirelessly. They also had their modified access point send out fake probe responses if a 
probe was detected. This research has provided great results for possibilities in modifying 
access points to increase wireless intrusion detection as well as good ideas for intrusion 
response. 
The system we designed does not use any modifications to an access point. However, 
a modified access point would definitely add increased security to our system. Our system 
relies on local detection, but a method of AP-based intrusion prevention and detection could 
be something to consider implementing in the future. 
2.2 Commercial and open-source software 
2.2.1 Kismet 
Kismet [3] is a software tool that has many features including the ability to sniff 
packets on a wireless network, identify wireless networks, and detect intrusions. Kismet is 
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also able to detect hidden networks, decode WEP packets, and log its actions. It is often used 
to detect wireless networks from a mobile computer. It can be used as a distributed intrusion 
detection system. It will also detect rogue access points, which can be useful for preventing 
unauthorized connections to your network. 
Kismet's network detection works passively; it simply collects packets and looks for 
information that indicates a network. Kismet can be set up to channel hop, so it can find all 
the networks in an area by switching through all wireless channels at a configured speed 
while logging and parsing data. Since Kismet looks at all packets it detects, it is able to find 
networks whose access point does not send out a beacon. This technique can be used to find 
rogue access points. Kismet is often used when wardriving because of its excellent network 
detection capabilities. 
Another important part of Kismet is its ability to detect certain types of wireless 
intrusions. Kismet has the capability to detect thirteen types of intrusions. Kismet can detect 
NetStumbler probes. NetStumbler is a tool that sends unique packets to try to find out the 
SSID of a network. An attacker may also spoof disassociation or deauthentication packets in 
order to get an authenticated node to disconnect from the network; Kismet also detects this. 
A tool known as Wellenreiter can be used to brute-force a hidden SSID, which Kismet can 
detect. If an AP changes its channel, this is seen as a possible intrusion, and Kismet will 
show an alert for this as well. Whenever a node is probing for networks but not joining any 
that respond to the probe, that activity is viewed as suspicious by Kismet, and an alert will be 
shown. A 0-length SSID in a packet can cause many firmware implementations to have a 
fatal error, so Kismet views this as a possible intrusion as well. Kismet will also detect likely 
attempts to spoof an SSID of an AP. 
In our system, which will be described more in detail later, Kismet is used to scan a 
specific wireless channel for intrusions. It logs all packets captured from that channel, and 
another intrusion detection tool, Snort, is used to detect many types of intrusions that Kismet 
may have missed. We have found Kismet to be the most comprehensive open source 
wireless intrusion detection tool available. 
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2.2.2 RFprotect Distributed 
Network Chemistry's RFprotect Distributed [4] is awell-known, distributed multi-
tiered intrusion detection system. It uses distributed access points to continually scan all 
wireless channels looking for possible attacks. Network Chemistry uses the term two-tiered 
to describe the fact that the data collected at each access point is sent to a centralized server 
which analyzes and correlates the incoming data from the sensors. Security alerts can be 
setup to notify administrators, and the system can also automatically respond by 
deauthenticating the offending device from the network. The centralized server is also a 
management console which can be used to inform the administrators of the latest wireless 
events or it can be used to respond to the events directly. The system we designed could be 
extended to be two-tiered, if Kismet drones were enabled and their findings sent to a Kismet 
server, but our current setup is entirely distributed. It also has the capability of scanning all 
wireless channels, but this is not necessary, because only attacks directed toward the channel 
being used would succeed. We also have security alerts displayed but not on a central 
console. 
2.2.3 AirDefense Enterprise 
AirDefense Enterprise[5] is a commercial solution to wireless network security. This 
system uses hardware and software which includes sensors placed throughout the network to 
detect intruders and attacks. The sensors report to a management console, which can be used 
by administrators. AirDefense Enterprise also has software that can be used to find potential 
vulnerabilities in the network that could be exploited by attackers. The system is a good 
combination of hardware and software mechanisms to detect and manage intruders as well as 
find possible flaws in the network. It has the ability to detect rogue APs and plot their 
location on a map. AirDefense Enterprise's sensors are also able to detect when policies are 
not being followed by nodes on the network. Last, the system also has extensive logging 
capabilities, useful for determining the specifics of any attack. 
Our system is similar to AirDefense Enterprise because we use hardware and 
software sensors deployed throughout a network. We use our wireless cards to detect 
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wireless traffic, and we use Kismet, Snort, and a custom tool to parse the traffic. Kismet 
does have the option of using GPS, which could possibly be used to find rogue APs and plot 
them on a map. Our logs and alerts would have to be better correlated to match AirDefense 
Enterprise's. 
2.2.4 Juniper Networks Integrated Firewall/IPSec VPN 
Juniper Networks [6] also provides intrusion detection and prevention systems for 
wireless networks. It will also find rogue access points and log wireless traffic. Their system 
has the ability to set up virtual zones to force all wireless traffic through certain nodes to 
check for authentication. This is interesting because it helps reduce the chance of an attack 
coming from anywhere. Our system can find rogue access points and log wireless traffic. 
We do not have the capability to force all wireless traffic through a virtual zone. 
2.2.5 AirMagnet Enterprise 
Another commercial product designed to protect wireless networks is AirMagnet 
Enterprise [7]. It will detect, prevent, and respond to intrusions. AirMagnet Enterprise can 
block wireless and wired connections as well as devices threatening the network by plotting 
the location of the device on a map. It can shut down rogue access points. Sensor devices 
must be deployed throughout the wireless network and an AirMagnet Enterprise server must 
be running to analyze reports. Our system is distributed throughout the wireless network, but 
it does not include intrusion prevention or response mechanisms. 
2.2.6 Red-M suite 
Red-M [8] is a different type of commercial solution. This solution requires well 
designed policies and auditing mechanisms. Sensors are deployed throughout the network to 
make sure there are no rogue APs; the sensors also make sure the authorized APs are 
working properly and according to policy. There are four main software tools in the Red-M 
suite including Red-Alert PRO, Red-Detect, Red-Mobile, and Red-Vision. Red-Alert PRO is 
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a node in the network that permanently monitors the wireless environment searching for 
unauthorized activity. It is used to collect information that can be passed to Red-Detect 
nodes which can use that data and correlate it with other data it has gathered. Red-Detect 
monitors a wide range of wireless attacks including deauthentication and disassociation 
attacks, SSID brute force attacks, repeated 802.1x authentication failures,. and others. It 
compiles all of the data it detects into useful reports and sends them to Red-Vision, which is 
a powerful centralized alert display and management console. Red-Vision saves 
administrators' time by displaying alerts in an easy-to-recognize fashion and allowing 
everything on the network to be audited. Red-Mobile is an intrusion detection system 
designed to work in a mobile environment such as on-site military operations, emergency 
situations, and other settings where nodes are on the move. It is basically an easy-to-use and 
easy-to-install intrusion detection system using Red-Alert PRO, Red-Detect, and Red-Vision. 
This is useful in the situations described before when administrators do not have the time to 
set up afully-fledged intrusion detection system. 
Red-M is an interesting and useful suite of software tools. Similarities between Red-
M and our system are the distributed sensors throughout the network and the ability to detect 
multiple types of wireless attacks. Our system does not create reports or send alerts to a 
centralized server for auditing and management, but it does have the capability to detect 
attacks that are not just wireless in nature, such as application layer attacks. 
2.2.7 WIDS 
WIDS [9] was developed at the Air Force Research Laboratory Information 
Directorate. All wireless layer 2 traffic will be monitored while looking for policy violations, 
unauthorized operations, possible intrusions, and incorrectly configured hardware. Physical 
sensors must be deployed throughout the network, and it can be centralized if needed. This 
system is meant to be deployed alongside existing wireless networks. The sensors are placed 
next to the access points and can report their findings to a centralized server in order to 
facilitate enterprise use. 
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For our system, we use a configuration that is similar to WIDS. We were unable to 
find out the specifics of how the intrusion detection system works, but our system relies on 
sensors deployed throughout the network running Kismet. Kismet can be set up to be 
managed by a centralized Kismet server, which could be conjoined with another intrusion 
detection tool such as Snort. 
2.2.8 Snort 
Snort [ 10] is an intrusion detection system that scans packet dumps using rule sets. A 
rule set is a collection of specific byte patterns that indicate certain types of attacks. There 
are a few rule sets on Snort's website, and they can also be easily created and added by the 
user. Snort can be configured to run in different configuration modes such as packet sniffer, 
packet logger, or intrusion detector. The types of attacks it can detect are buffer overflows, 
OS fingerprinting, and stealth scans, among others. The problem with just using Snort is that 
it was not designed to detect wireless attacks. It does have the capability to detect a few 
types of 802.1 lb attacks, such as deauthentication floods. However, we use it in our system 
because it can be configured to detect many different types of attacks that can't be detected 
by only a wireless intrusion detection tool such as Kismet. 
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3 System design 
The purpose of the system we designed is to detect attacks on a wireless network. 
Most of the related work in this area has been designed to detect attacks on a wired network. 
We decided to use previously developed tools to detect intrusions on a wireless network 
using principles that apply to wireless networks. We use Kismet and Snort in conjunction 
with a custom developed tool to detect intrusions on a wireless network. 
To test the detection methods, we implemented a computer worm. Worms are 
similar to computer viruses except that they don't require human interaction to propagate. 
For example, a virus may require a user to click on an email or run an attachment. However, 
worms exploit security vulnerabilities and use them to gain control of system. From there 
they begin scanning for other vulnerable nodes and attempt to exploit them. The worm we 
developed takes advantage of a specific flaw in a routing protocol. We use Kismet, Snort, 
and our CPU usage utility to make sure the detection system was reliable. The worm is 
designed to exploit a vulnerability in the Optimized Link State Routing protocol. 
3.1 Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) 
In order to understand how the worm spreads across the testing network, it is 
important to understand a few key things about the way OLSR [ 11 ] works. OLSR is a good 
protocol to use in networks that are dense and/or large because of the way it's optimized to 
reduce overhead when flooding messages throughout the network. It also works well in a 
network where nodes are frequently moving about or joining/leaving the network such as a 
mobile ad-hoc network (MANET). OLSR is a proactive protocol; routes are available when 
they are needed instead of being discovered when needed as in a reactive protocol. 
OLSR, as the name states, is an improved and optimized version of the link state 
routing (LSR) protocol. There are a few important differences between OLSR and LSR. 
Typically, in LSR, when a node wishes to send out its link state information, it must 
broadcast its message to all of its neighbors, then all of those neighbors must broadcast the 
message to all of their neighbors, etc., until the message is distributed throughout the 
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network. This implies that every node in the network must broadcast the message every time 
a message needs to be flooded throughout the network. OLSR optimizes the flooding 
mechanism by selecting a subset of nodes, called multipoint relays (MPRs) to do 
broadcasting in the network. 
A MPR is a node in the network. Every node in the network has a set of MPRs. Each 
node will select a set of MPRs from its 1-hop neighbors. A set of MPRs for a node N will be 
able to take a message from node N and make sure all of node N's 2-hop neighbors will 
receive the message. The link between node N and each of its MPRs must be symmetric: 
both the MPR and node N can send and receive messages from each other. The fewer MPRs 
there are in the MPR set for a node, the better. So if a node wishes to have a message sent to 
everyone in the network it will broadcast the message, then all of the 1-hop nodes will 
receive it; however, only the MPRs will continue to broadcast the message. 
This type of flooding works very well in large and dense networks. Instead of 
requiring every node in that network to transmit the message, only a subset of the nodes in 
the network will have to transmit. This can greatly reduce the amount of congestion and 
bandwidth being used to send a message to everyone on the network. This is the most 
important improvement that OLSR contributes to LSR, but use of MPRs still enables a few 
other optimizations over LSR. 
The use of MPRs makes it easier to compute the shortest route between two nodes. 
Only MPRs will generate and transmit link state information. The shortest path between any 
nodes will use the MPRs to get from the starting node to the ending node. This cuts back on 
the number of control messages required to maintain routing tables. A third benefit to using 
MPRs is that they may choose to only broadcast the links they have with other MPRs. In 
LSR, full link information is transmitted between the nodes, but this is not required with 
OLSR. This also helps cut back on overhead. Even though not all link information is 
transmitted, specifically the links between MPRs and non-MPRs, those links may still be 
used for added redundancy. 
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3.1.1 OLSR packets 
OLSR uses a custom packet format to communicate between nodes in the network 
running OLSR. In the implementation we use, this packet header is included after the regular 
headers for TCP and IP, because the implementation runs in the application layer. Within the 
packet header, there are a few fields that need to be explained to understand how our worm is 
able to exploit OLSR. HELLO messages, topology control messages (TC messages), and 
multiple interface declaration messages (MID messages) are the types of messages that must 
be supported by an OLSR implementation. HELLO messages are used by our worm to 
propagate, and they will be described in detail below. 
Figure 1 shows the OLSR packet format. Packet Length and Packet Sequence 
Number are the first two fields in an OLSR packet. Packet Length is simply the total length 
of the packet in bytes. The Packet Sequence Number is incremented each time an interface 
transmits a new packet. These two fields make up the packet header. 
'rcf •i ~ ~ C ~~ ~ S~ ~ iL ter! 1 ~ +J ,} .~S ~ G~ ~~ ~ '~T' ~ 
C t  ~ t ) iI ~C 
i ~•~ ~, ~:~ ~ 
~Y n.'~ 
~it~ FYI ~ I.~ ii ~ ~~~ ~ ~ '` ~.~ ~i fi ^~J~ ~ -* rl~iV ~~ •` ~~~ 
T, --. -~ ~ ~ T-. 
~"~ ~t ~~ ~ 
~~.L ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Lt ~ .~ ~ 4( ~`  ~ !/; ~ ..ice 'i~ .f.~ ~ ~ ~ ~: L;~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,~j 
'V'~.L ~ ~.~ 2s LL '.r t~ ~ i 1L1~.~ ~ a~I s..: 
Jr ~.lZ.,i. ~ ~ 1 .rr'; ~.. al' ~ Ss. ~?~r' .1 i~Y 'cri 1.`~. ~ ~L ~ +~J t....i ~ ~~ ~ t..J ~`1ii. ~3. .1 ~4~ w i Y:Yi~.l T—
r~ .t./
.~+A~ T.9 
Y ~1 
Figure 1: OLSR packet format, 32 bits wide, from [11]. 
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The message header, immediately following the packet header and included at the 
beginning of each message in the packet, consists of the Message Type, which describes 
what type of message is included next. The Vtime field is used to let the receiving node 
know how long the information within the message must be considered to be valid. Message 
Size is the size of the message headers and the message itself measured in bytes. The node 
that sent the message includes its main address in the Originator Address field, which isn't 
changed if the packet is retransmitted, unlike the source address in the IP header. 
Now that the packet and message format has been described, it is possible to 
understand how the worm works. If OLSR was running on a wireless network, it would 
provide an easy way for an attacker to find targets: the routing table. As mentioned earlier, 
OLSR transmits HELLO messages when setting up a connection between two computers. 
This allows computers to set up links, which can be asymmetric or symmetric, and 
symmetric links are added to the routing table. A computer worm could use a HELLO 
message to invade a computer running OLSR. 
3.1.2 HELLO messages 
For the scope of this paper, the most important part to understand about OLSR is the 
HELLO messages sent out by each node to discover its links. Each node must create a link 
set, which is a set of nodes it can communicate with. The nodes that go in the link set are 1-
hop nodes. Each link in the set has a status associated with it. The status given to a link will 
be symmetric or asymmetric. If two-way communication between two neighbor nodes has 
taken place, the link is rated as symmetric; if a node can only receive from another node, but 
not transmit to that node, the link is given an asymmetric rating. Anode can discover its link 
set by sending out HELLO messages. 
A HELLO message is sent out periodically by each node. A HELLO message should 
never be forwarded by another node, as it is used only to discover 1-hop neighbors. It is a 
specially formatted packet that OLSR knows how to parse. There are a number of fields 
included in the HELLO message: understanding the format of the HELLO message and what 
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it is used for will be important in understanding how the worm we developed is able to 
propagate. 
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Figure 2: OLSR HELLO message format, 32 bits wide, from [11]. 
Figure 2 shows the OLSR HELLO message format. The Reserved fields are set to 
zero incase they are needed in the future. Htime is used to indicate the time interval before 
that node will transmit its next HELLO message. The Willingness field is used to describe 
how willing the node is to forward messages. The Link Code indicates different types of 
information about the following interface links. This information could be whether or not the 
link is symmetric or asymmetric as well as its relation to the node's neighbors. The Link 
Message Size field is the number of bytes starting from the previous Link Code field until the 
beginning of the next Link Code field. The size is important for including different sets of 
different types of interface links. It is also used to indicate when there are no following links. 
The Neighbor Interface Address is the address of a neighbor node. 
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3.2 Worm design 
First let's cover a worm's basic activities. Every worm has at least three steps: target 
discovery, propagation, and activation [ 12] . 
3.2.1 Target discovery 
Each worm requires a method for finding potential targets. If a worm has no targets, 
it cannot propagate, and it would not be a very successful worm. The target discovery 
method also has a large impact on how quickly the worm will be able to propagate to all the 
machines with exploitable vulnerabilities. A worm could scan sequentially through the 
address space, checking whether each address is vulnerable one at a time, to find potential 
targets. The problem with this method is the amount of time it takes. Scanning through all 
IPv4 addresses would take quite some time, depending on the scanning method used. The 
problem is exaggerated quite a bit if the worm was attempting to discover targets on IPv6 
networks by scanning because of the large address space. Of course, there are optimizations 
that can be made to scanning worms. One way to optimize a scanning routine is to divide the 
space to be scanned by each worm. For example, a worm could start scanning through all 
addresses at the beginning, and then once it finds a target to exploit, it tells the worm running 
on that machine to scan only a part of the remaining space. Each time a new worm starts 
running on a new machine, it will be scanning a different set of the address space in order to 
limit or completely avoid overlapping scans and reduce the amount of time it takes to scan all 
the addresses. 
Other optimizations can be made to a scanning routine such as using bandwidth-
limited scanning instead of latency-limited scanning. When a worm is limited by latency, it 
is scanning each address one by one, waiting for a response, or lack of response, from each 
address until moving on to the next one. Abandwidth-limited scan would send a query to 
one address and move on to the next address. It would address the reply from the first 
address when it received it, instead of idly waiting for a response. In the time alatency-
limited scanner would test just one address, abandwidth-limited scanner would have sent 
queries to a number of other addresses. Scanning worms can also be implemented to prefer 
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local targets. So a worm using this optimization would scan local IP address space before 
checking addresses which are on the Internet. This would result in a worm which spread 
very quickly through each network once it infected the first machine on that network. 
Passive worms do not scan; instead, they wait for potential targets to come to them. 
A worm using this method of target discovery will spread more slowly, but it will also spread 
stealthier. Instead of producing a lot of traffic scanning for addresses, it can subtly read 
incoming packets, checking for potential target addresses. This is useful when a worm 
wishes to remain undetected. 
A different type of target discovery relies on target lists. There are a few different 
ways to get target lists. The potentially fastest spreading worm would use- apre-generated 
target list. A list like this would be obtained before the worm is released by scanning through 
the address space and checking for vulnerable machines, Any machines that were discovered 
to be vulnerable would be added to a target list. A worm could then take the target list and 
attack each target on the list without wasting any time scanning. Additionally, as each 
machine is infected, the new copy of the worm will be given a partial copy of the target list. 
So the target list is distributed throughout the worm network as the worm infects more 
machines, which means it will take less with each new infection to attack the rest of the 
targets on the list. This type of spreading could infect all vulnerable machines on the Internet 
in an hour or less, as described in [13]. Another benefit to using this type of target discovery 
is the method used to generate the target list can be spread out over days or months, in order 
to reduce the likelihood of being detected. 
Externally generated target lists rely on some type of server to query that can provide 
a list of machines to infect. For example, popular multiplayer games often require the client 
to contact a metaserver that provides a list of currently running game servers. If a worm 
were to query a server like that, for example, it would quickly receive a list of all the 
vulnerable targets. This method would work on anything that generated a list of machines 
running a specific type of service. 
Last, an internally generated target list is what we chose to use for our worm. 
Internally generated target lists are useful when there is some service on the infected machine 
that can provide potentially vulnerable machines. Our worm uses the routing table in this 
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case, because OLSR adds all other nodes with symmetric links to the routing table. Simply 
reading the routing table allows our worm to quickly find all potential targets within 
transmission range. 
3.2.2 Propagation methods 
Another factor in the design of our worm is its propagation method. There are three 
categories of propagation: self-carried, embedded, and second channel. A second channel 
propagation mechanism requires the use of a separate communication channel from the one 
being used to infect the machine. For example, one of the earlier versions of our worm used 
TFTP to let the infected computer download a copy of the binary of the worm from the 
infecting machine. TFTP required a second communication channel. This is the least 
desired way to have a worm propagate because the anomalous behavior could raise alarms. 
However, the worm we developed has been improved to transmit itself using the 
socket opened by the worm to the target machine. This is an example of self-carried 
propagation. Any worm that transmits itself over an already existing channel of 
communication is self-carried. This is better than second channel propagation because the 
behavior is not as anomalous. 
The stealthiest way to have a worm transmit itself would be to use embedded 
propagation. A worm using this method would be able to include a copy of itself in normal 
messages. So if our worm was able to embed itself in a normal OLSR packet, it would be 
said to use embedded propagation. Our worm only sends shellcode in the OLSR packet; it 
does not send a copy of itself, so it does not qualify for this type of propagation. Embedded 
worm transmission would make a good combination with passive worms; this type of target 
discovery and propagation working together would result in a worm that is very difficult to 
detect. 
3.2.3 Activation 
[14] enumerates four different types of activation methods for worms. We previously 
defined a computer worm to be a piece of software that propagates itself without requiring 
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human interaction. One of [ 14]'s activation methods is human activation. A worm that 
relies on human activation is a virus by the definition we're using for this paper. 
There is a difference between human activation and human activity-based activation: 
the former requires a user to directly initiate the worm; however the latter can indicate a user 
operating his/her computer normally, in which some action triggers the worm. A simple 
example would be restarting the computer: the worm is running when the computer comes 
back up, but the user did not directly start the worm. Human activation and human activity-
based activation are both inefficient methods for worms to be activated. This can obviously 
slow down the infection speed of a worm tremendously if it must wait to be activated after 
being transferred to the next computer. However, these methods may also work well in 
conjunction with stealthy ways of target discovery and propagation. 
Scheduled process activation is another method of activation that relies on a process 
which automatically downloads updates, or contacts a server and downloads some software 
to run. If the server could be spoofed, or the target machine's DNS could be redirected, for 
example, the target machine would download the worm from an infecting computer instead 
of downloading the software update. It would then activate the worm instead of installing the 
update it attempted to download. Combining this type of activation with a stealthy type of 
propagation would result in a worm that is hard to detect. 
Last, the fastest worms use self-activation. The worm we use in our testing belongs 
to this type. The infecting worm simply sends a command to execute the newly copied 
worm. Specifically, in our own worm, it sends a shell command that initiates the copy of the 
worm. 
3.2.4 Payload, motivation, and attackers 
[ 12] also spends time discussing payloads, motivations, and attackers, which is 
beyond the scope of our research. Our purpose is to test intrusion detection software. What 
the worm is carrying is not our concern. Since it's not a real worm, the motivation is simply 
research, and the attacker is actually the defender. 
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[ 14] defines seven characteristics that must be considered before implementing a 
worm. These characteristics affected the design of our worm as well. Portability, 
1nVlslblllty, independence, learning, integrity, polymorphism, and usability are the traits 
described in [ 14] . 
3.2.5 Portabi I ity 
Portability is important to the success of a worm because if it cannot be ported to 
other machines, let alone other operating systems, then it will not be a very successful worm. 
The portability of our own worm wasn't as important as a worm being written to be 
successful on the Internet. In a local network, portability may not be important at all, 
especially in cases where .the network setup is extremely homogenous, such as a sensor 
network. All the computers would be running the same operating system and likely have the 
same hardware and operating environment. In that case, if the worm worked on one 
machine, it will very probably work on all of the machines in the network. Again, it depends 
on what the worm is designed to do. Portability would be extremely important when trying 
to infect machines on the Internet, which will have a wide range of setups including different 
hardware, operating systems, and configurations. The network we use in our testing consists 
of machines set up similarly to each other, so we didn't worry much about the portability. 
3.2.6 Invisibility 
It is necessary to consider the degree of invisibility the worm is required to maintain 
for a few different reasons. We want to make sure the worm is a good test of our intrusion 
detection system. If the worm is not very stealthy and is easy to detect in process lists, 
changes its name to something obvious, or opens up lots of connections, it's going to be 
easily discovered and won't be a good test of our intrusion detection system. As we 
mentioned previously, an earlier version of our worm used Tr~l'P to transfer itself, however 
this is easier to detect because it requires a new connection to be opened, so we improved the 
invisibility of the worm by having it use an already open connection. There are other 
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improvements that could be made to our worm that will decrease the chance of it being 
caught by an IDS. These upgrades will be discussed in future work. 
3.2.7 Independence 
Independence refers to the worm's ability to spread without user-interaction. As we 
discussed in the activation methods section, a worm would be slowed tremendously if it can't 
activate itself. A worm must be able to identify targets, propagate, and activate completely 
autonomously if it is to be successful. Part of this is having the capability to exploit 
vulnerabilities in a wide range of systems. Again, this comes back to portability. If a worm 
needs to be successful in infecting lots of computers on the Internet, it would need to have 
knowledge of multiple vulnerabilities in common services in a wide range of operating 
systems in order to maximize the number of machines it will be able to infect. Our own 
worm is completely independent once it is started. This is partially enabled by the fact that 
our test network is very homogenous. 
3.2.8 Learning and integrity 
Learning and integrity are two more traits that are important in [ 14] . A worm that can 
learn could communicate with other worms and update itself with new exploits or fix bugs in 
its own code. This would allow worms to continue being successful at propagating for a 
longer amount of time because they could continue to exploit new weakness as they are 
found. For our research, we were not concerned with this. In order to test our IDS, we didn't 
need a worm that could learn, so we haven't devoted research to this. Integrity is another 
area that we haven't spent much time on. It is important that a worm be difficult to modify 
or interfere with to keep people from reverse engineering it or prevent it from working. 
Again, our worm is only being tested on our networks, so this wasn't a concern. 
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3.2.9 Polymorphism and metamorphism 
Something that could affect how well our intrusion detection system works is whether 
or not the worm is polymorphic. A polymorphic worm is an encrypted worm. A decryptor 
that can be used to decrypt the worm would be inserted before the encrypted worm. The 
decryptor and the encrypted worm would be different each time the worm propagated, 
because the worm itself would generate the -new encryption method and the decryption 
function. Polymorphism can make it more difficult for intrusion detection methods relying 
on misuse detection to catch a worm, because suddenly the pattern that the IDS is searching 
for changes every time. Another way around this would be to use a metamorphic worm. A 
metamorphic worm is a worm in which instructions are added, removed, and rearranged each 
time a new copy of the worm is generated. For example, if the original worm contains the 
instructions A, B, and C. Anew copy of the worm could be A, do nothing, B, do nothing, 
and C. So now the program is broken up by bytes that do not cause the worm to behave 
properly because they do nothing, such as a NOP command. Another example would be to 
add one to a register and subtract one from the same register: two instructions that in effect 
do nothing. The code can also be rearranged to include jump commands. So the code flows 
the same, but the instructions are in a different order because the code jumps back and forth 
to different locations within the binary. Both polymorphic and metamorphic worms are more 
difficult to detect than worms that transmit the same code each time, because byte patterns 
that occur in one copy may not be found in another copy of the same worm. Our worm does 
not include a polymorphic or metamorphic engine, but it would be something to look into in 
the future. 
3.2.10 Usability 
Usability is also something to consider when designing a worm. If a worm isn't 
controllable, or doesn't do what it is supposed to, then it's not very successful. The worm 
could have a function that allows it to disable and remove itself after receiving a command 
from its creators to remove all evidence of the intrusion. [14] suggests it may be a good idea 
to transmit just a part of the worm, without any payload, until the worm finds an interesting 
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target. At that point the worm can download the payload and deploy it. This prevents people 
from obtaining the entire worm at once or leaving full copies of the worm on every system it 
infects to be reverse engineered. Our worm has two different modes which can be used to 
control it, which will be explained in detail later. 
[ 14] used the term wormnet to describe a network of worms, that could communicate 
with each other, send and receive updates to/from each other, relay commands, and share 
exploits. This type of network would allow a worm to have access to many more resources 
and be more robust. It would be a lot more successful in proliferating throughout a large 
network such as the Internet if it could rely on other worms to help. It is interesting that [ 14] 
didn't mention that this kind of wormnet that receives and transmits commands resembles a 
botnet. If someone could give commands to one worm and have the commands distributed 
throughout the entire network of worms, it would be easy to conduct distributed denial of 
service attacks. This feature wasn't necessary for our testing however, and we haven't 
implemented it. 
The worm is designed to test our intrusion detection system, and it does its job. It is 
able to autonomously find its targets in the routing table, propagate by transmitting itself over 
an existing connection, and activate itself. As we mentioned, the research in [14] indicates 
that there are also many more ways of improving our worm, which would be useful in testing 
our IDS more realistically and thoroughly. 
3.3 System design 
Worms are entirely capable of infecting all machines in a network in a very short 
amount of time. In fact, a properly designed worm using a large enough pre-generated target 
list could infect all vulnerable computers on the Internet in an hour or less [13]. Humans are 
not capable of reacting quickly enough to a fast-paced worm. This is part of the reason why 
intrusion detection software is necessary. 
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Figure 3: System architecture. 
Our test network consists of two computers communicating wirelessly in ad-hoc 
mode. We use a few different tools for intrusion detection. The implementation used to 
detect this worm and other attacks is based on a combination of Kismet, Snort, and a custom 
developed tool. Figure 3 illustrates the architecture of our system. Kismet is useful in 
monitoring all wireless channels for many different wireless-specific attacks. Security alerts 
are displayed on-screen on the kismet console. Kismet also logs all packets it encounters to 
a log file. It is also possible to configure Kismet to send the packets to a FIFO pipe. For our 
intrusion detection system we have configured Kismet to continuously scan the channel 
being used by the ad-hoc network for wireless attacks and dump all the packets it receives 
into the FIFO pipe. 
We use Snort to parse the input from Kismet for attacks that aren't specific to 
wireless networks. Snort can be configured to read packets from the FIFO pipe and scan for 
known attacks based on their patterns. Snort can also be configured to scan for user-defined 
patterns called rules, which we use to check for byte patterns in our worm. 
Last, we have developed a tool that can monitor CPU usage and process names. We 
have the tool monitor the OLSR process. The tool checks to make sure OLSR isn't using 
27 
more of the CPU than it normally would. It also monitors the process name OLSR uses, 
because when the worm takes over, it changes the process name. Using the combination of 
those three tools we have designed ahost-based, multilevel intrusion detection system. We 
will describe how it is implemented in detail now. 
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4 Implementation 
4.1 Worm implementation 
The worm uses the routing table for target discovery. Since OLSR sets up the routing 
tables with connections to other computers in the wireless network, it is a simple task for a 
worm to get addresses to potential targets. Scanning in this case would be a waste of 
resources and time because OLSR lists the connections in the routing table. Other methods 
to find targets would include inspecting incoming and outgoing packets for addresses and 
pre-generated target lists. The worm simply lists the routing table, resolves host names to IP 
addresses, and filters it using a regular expression. What's left is a list of local IP addresses 
that should be running the OLSR process. 
Transmitting the worm from one computer to the next usually requires some kind of 
vulnerability to exploit in order to set up a connection to transmit and execute the worm on 
the remote computer. In order to exploit OLSR, a stack buffer overflow caused by 
s trcpy ( ) has been added to packet processing code. A specially crafted packet is then 
sent from an attacking machine to the machine running the vulnerable version of OLSR. 
The packet that the worm sends is basically a modified OLSR packet that includes a 
single HELLO message. The OLSR packet is formatted according to the specifications 
described before until the neighbor interface address field. Instead of including a neighbor 
interface address, the packet includes our code which will overflow a buffer on the target 
machine. 
The s trcpy () that we inserted into the code doesn't check the length of the 
transmitted packet. It copies all of the data in the packet into a character buffer that isn't 
large enough to hold all the bytes in the packet. As a result, some of the bytes written to the 
stack overwrite the return pointer, which is also saved on the stack. If the bytes used in the 
attack are crafted correctly, the return pointer is overwritten with a new return address. 
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Figure 4: Example format of a buffer overflow. 
When the packet processing function returns, it returns to the new address the attacker 
provides. This stack address should lie somewhere in the range of a NOP sled. A NOP is 
also known as a "no operation" command. When a NOP is executed, the processor just goes 
on to the next instruction. A NOP sled is used when the starting address of the transmitted 
shellcode is unknown. Since there can be variations in a computer's runtime environment, 
stack addresses can differ from computer to computer. When a function returns to an address 
that resides in a NOP sled, each NOP is executed, which basically slides execution of the 
program down to the shellcode, which is what the attacker wants to be run on the target 
computer. 
Shellcode is just assembly language translated into hexadecimal. It is commonly 
used to open up command shells when exploiting buffer overflows. It is dependent on the 
operating system as well as hardware. For example, shellcode running on a Linux operating 
system won't work on a Windows operating system. It is possible to write shellcode that will 
work on multiple operating systems, but it's really just separate pieces of shellcode that are 
selected and run based on the target operating system [15]. Figure 4 gives an example format 
of a buffer overflow, which is similar to what is used in our worm. 
In the case of the worm designed for this project, the shellcode is set up to bind a 
command shell to accept unauthenticated connections on port 43690. This is done using 
execve () and common socket functions such as bind () ,listen () ,and accept () . 
Ne t c a t can be used to connect and send commands, just like typing in commands at a local 
command shell. The worm uses socket functions to establish a connection and sends 
commands using the socket write () method. 
After sending the packet that will overflow the remote buffer, the infecting worm 
sleeps for a few seconds. This is necessary to allow the remote computer time to process the 
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packet and set up the backdoor. The majority of the time it takes for our worm to propagate 
is due to this sleep command, but it is necessary, because the computer may be busy handling 
other processes. Trying to establish a connection immediately in that case would result in an 
error, because the machine would not be listening for a connection. Another way around this 
is to have the infecting machine attempt to connect several times before giving up. A 
combination of waiting and attempting to connect a few times could also be used, but right 
now our worm just waits a few seconds, and it works unless the computer's CPU load is 
abnormally high. 
Once a connection to the target machine is established using the open socket, the 
worm needs to send a copy of itself to the remote computer. A Linux utility called xxd is 
used for this step. This program is used to create a hex dump of the worm binary. This hex 
dump is transmitted to the remote computer over the connection, and a command is given to 
the remote shell to reassemble the hex dump to a binary file using xxd. The binary file is 
recreated in the / tmp directory, and a command is sent over the open connection to make it 
executable using the Linux command chmod. 
Once a copy of the worm has been transmitted to the target machine, the original 
worm simply sends an execute command to the worm using the existing backdoor. After 
that, the communication between the two computers ceases, and the new copy of the worm 
begins looking for targets in the routing table and continuing the process of infecting as many 
machines as possible. This method of target discovery, propagation, and activation allows a 
computer worm to very quickly infect an entire network of computers, especially if all the 
computers on the network are running homogeneous setups, such as a wireless mobile ad-hoc 
sensor network. In this case, any vulnerability existing in one machine will likely exist in all 
other machines, enabling the worm to quickly spread and take over all the machines. 
The worm can be initiated at the command line of one of the machines on the 
network. The worm must be told which mode to operate in, which is described later, and it 
must be given an IP address to attempt to infect if it is to run in target mode. The class C 
network that it is to operate in must also be specified. This is to keep the worm from 
spreading out of control, and also to allow the worm to keep track of which nodes it has 
previously visited. The last three digits of an IP address that the machine has infected are 
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compressed and concatenated to the command line. This way, each time the worm is run on 
a new machine, it can decompress the history and view which machines have been infected 
on that local network. This also keeps it from wasting time trying to infect machines that 
may already have a copy of the worm on them but still show up in the routing table. 
our worm can be configured to run in two separate modes. The first mode tells the 
worm to propagate to any target on the network. So if an address shows up in the routing 
table, OLSR is running on that machine, and the worm will try to take it over. If there is a 
specific machine that the worm should attempt to propagate to, it can be set to target mode; 
an address is passed on the command line to the worm, and the worm will attack each 
machine on the route to the target machine. For example, let's say the worm needs to attack 
machine D, but the worm starts at machine A. The route from A to D is A -> B -> C -> D. 
Therefore, if the worm is set to target mode, with machine D's address passed to the worm 
on the command line, it will attack machine B, machine C, and then machine D. Also, 
instead of propagating to the target machine, it leaves the machine with a backdoor open to a 
shell, so that a human operator can have direct control over the machines once it is exploited 
by the worm. 
The worm is configured to attempt to propagate to every address in the routing table 
until it has exhausted the possibilities, but, for testing purposes, it only infects one node on 
the network per infection. So each machine will only affect one other machine at most. 
After trying to infect one machine or finding no targets in the routing table, the worm 
terminates. It leaves a copy of itself on the machine it infected, because that made it easier 
for us to determine whether a machine had been infected or not. Areal worm would want to 
remove all traces of itself if possible. Overall the worm does what we need it to do; our 
worm is capable of transmitting itself quickly to every other computer on the network. As 
we mentioned earlier, the limiting factor in propagation is the amount of time it takes for the 
remote computer to process the packet containing the exploit and open a listening 
connection. Potential improvements to our worm will be included in the future work section. 
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4.2 Tool implementation 
A tool was developed to monitor the CPU usage of the OLSR protocol as it runs on a 
machine. Normally, the CPU usage is very low, however, while testing, it was found that 
CPU usage spiked when the worm was being transmitted and executed. The tool looks for a 
spike in CPU usage, and if the usage is above a certain threshold, an alert is generated. The 
tool also monitors the process name. When the worm takes over OLSR the process name 
switches from nr 101 s rd to sh, because the worm spawns a shell in order to receive 
commands from the attacking computer. This tool uses the Linux utility top to get statistics 
on CPU usage and process names. Top can be configured to output this information 
periodically, which is read by the tool as it receives the information. 
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5 Testing 
5.1 Tesi setup 
In our test setup we used a small network •of two computers running Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux 4.0 using kernel 2.6.9. Some setup is required to enable the OLSR protocol 
to be exploited. Other than inserting the Strcpy (} vulnerability, we must also disable the 
Linux firewall, in order to allow UDP packets to be sent and received on each computer. It is 
not necessary to completely disable the firewall, but at the minimum, UDP communication 
must be allowed. 
Next, a relatively recent feature added to some Linux implementations is ExecShield. 
ExecShield has been included in some distributions in order to reduce the number of 
successful exploits for vulnerabilities in software. ExecShield does this by keeping the stack 
from being executable. It also includes randomizations in the stack, location of shared 
libraries, and starting addresses of programs' heaps. It is necessary to disable this because 
the buffer overflow used in OLSR requires being able to execute shellcode placed on the 
stack, and it won't work with random stack addresses. 
There are a couple of reasons for installing a buffer overflow to test the spread of a 
worm throughout our network. First, by installing a buffer overflow in our implementation 
of OLSR, it keeps the worm from spreading to other implementations. It would be careless 
to allow a worm intended for research to escape into the wild. The second reason for 
disabling some security features instead of making the worm more robust is that we wanted 
to study the spread of the worm; the purpose of our research wasn't to investigate the latest 
ways of exploiting vulnerabilities. We needed an actual implementation of a worm that 
would run on our computers, so that we could obtain concrete results, the quickest way to 
develop a worm was to disable ExecShield. To develop a fully functional worm, capable of 
operating whether or not ExecShield was running would've been outside the scope of our 
research. 
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The very first thing our worm does after being executed is check for the presence of 
the directory / go /yes . Without this directory, the worm will immediately exit instead of 
proceeding normally. We implemented this check, again, because we didn't want our worm 
to accidentally spread into the wild. 
The machines on our network each have two wireless network cards installed. First, 
each machine has one USB wireless card. This is the wireless card that is used by OLSR to 
send and receive packets. Each machine also has one PCI wireless card. This card is used by 
Kismet to monitor wireless traffic. There are two reasons for this setup. First, the USB card 
we have on each computer does not have any native Linux drivers, so the Windows drivers 
must be installed using ndiswrapper. Unfortunately, the version of Kismet we are using does 
not support ndiswrapper, so we needed another wireless card that Kismet would support. 
Second, in order to transmit the worm over a wireless connection and use Kismet to monitor 
the channel, two wireless cards are necessary. When Kismet uses a wireless interface, it sets 
that interface to monitor mode, which prevents the wireless card from transmitting packets. 
So it is necessary to have two wireless cards in order to transmit the worm wirelessly and 
detect it using Kismet and Snort. The USB wireless cards are configured to run in ad-hoc 
mode. The PCI wireless cards can join an access point or remain unconnected to any access 
points. 
Next, both computers in our network must be running OLSR. This is obvious, 
because this is what our worm exploits in order to propagate itself from one computer to the 
next. We use the Naval Research Laboratory's implementation of OLSR, with the exception 
of our added modification to the code, because the worm was originally developed for their 
networks to be used for. their research in intrusion detection as well. Their implementation is 
known as nr 10 l s rd. We configured nr 101 s rd to use the USB wireless card interface. 
The remainder of the setup can be done on just one computer; this computer will be 
running the intrusion detection software as well as initiating the worm. However, the 
intrusion detection software could be used on both computers just as easily, and it would be 
optimal in most situations to have a distributed intrusion detection system. So in that case, 
installing and running Kismet and Snort, along with our CPU tool, on each machine would 
be a good idea. Kismet could also be configured to run on each machine as a drone and 
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report to a centralized server, which could then be the only machine running Snort on the 
output produced by all the drones. This is useful in situations where node resources are 
limited. 
Kismet must be installed and configured to run on at least one machine. On our 
network it uses the PCI wireless card to monitor wireless traffic. There are two ways Kismet 
could be run: with or without channel hopping. Channel hopping is good for finding all of 
the networks in the area, but staying with one channel is good for logging all of the traffic on 
that channel. Because our worm transmits so quickly, it is necessary to lock Kismet to the 
channel that the wireless USB cards are using. If this is not done, it is likely that Kismet will 
be on a different channel while the worm is transmitting. This means that the transmitted 
packets will not be captured and logged, so Snort will not be able to parse them and log an 
intrusion attempt. However, Kismet can be configured to use multiple network interfaces to 
scan multiple channels at once, but we were only using one wireless card in monitor mode, 
so we did not have that option. In order to have Snort continually read the packets that 
Kismet outputs, Kismet must be configured to send the packets to a FIFO pipe. This can be 
set up in the configuration file. 
Ki smet i s able to detect thirteen different attacks on wireless networks, but it does not 
contain a database of patterns to scan for like Snort has. Snort is used to parse the file 
containing all the received packets. One of the rules that Snort is configured to check for is a 
long string of NOPs. In this case, the OLSR worm transmits around nine-hundred 
consecutive NOPs, which Snort will identify and log as a possible intrusion attempt. In this 
fashion, it is possible to detect the worm as it is transmitted between computers; this is 
because Snort is looking for a specific combination of bytes it transmits, which depend on the 
worm or attack being used in each case. Custom rules can be used for Snort, but in this case 
it was not necessary, because the rule to detect a string of consecutive NOPs was already 
included. It may be necessary to define custom rules when NOPs are not used in the worm, 
which will be discussed briefly later. 
Now the rest of the intrusion detection system must be set up. Snort has a command 
line switch that can be used to tell Snort to read from a file. If the file is actually a FIFO 
pipe, Snort will process all packets in that pipe continuously until the pipe is closed. Snort 
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must also be run in full alert mode, so that we can tai 1 the log file and see any intrusions as 
they happen. Full alert mode gives us verbose output in the log file, so we can see What 
Snort is detecting. 
The CPU usage monitoring tool is the last tool that must be initialized. It requires the 
PID of OLSR process so it can monitor the process using top. A CPU threshold must also 
be given to the tool. For example, a threshold of 10 means that when the CPU usage for the 
OLSR process is above 10%, the tool should output an alert. During our testing we found 
that the CPU usage for nr l o l s rd, as shown by top, was almost always 0.0. Setting the 
threshold to anything above this is likely to catch the worm as it takes over nr 101 s rd, 
because CPU usage spikes. An optional parameter for this tool is how frequently to update 
the CPU usage statistic. The default is an update every one hundredth of a second. 
So far the network and intrusion detection systems have been configured and 
initialized. The only thing remaining to do is attack the network to see if the intrusion 
detection system works. For a network of only two computers it doesn't matter which mode 
the worm is told to use. Nr 101 s rd will not put a route to itself into its routing table, so 
when the worm is run, it will not attack itself, it will always try attacking the other machine 
first, and then it will try attacking the machine it started on because it is still running 
nr 101 s rd. The worm also keeps track of machines it has visited, so it won't try to attack a 
machine it has attacked before. This is turned off in target mode, because routes could 
change, and the worm may need to attempt to backtrack. This is especially possible in a 
MANET where machines may be joining and leaving the network as well as moving around 
quite frequently. 
So the worm is configured to run in either mode and given the class C address of the 
network the machines are in. The history passed to worm on the command line doesn't 
matter When It is Initlally run, because it builds the history as it transmits between computers. 
So the worm is started on one of the machines and quickly infects the remaining nodes on the 
network. 
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5.2 ~ Test results 
Testing shows that Kismet logs the packets it sees on the wireless network into the 
FIFO pipe and Snort detects the worm as it is transmitted. We usually get four alerts in our 
alert log. Let us name our two machines A and B. The worm starts on machine A. The first 
alert we see is that machine A is sending shellcode to machine B. Then we get an alert that 
indicates machine B is sending shellcode to machine A. So, first, the worm attacks the 
OLSR process on machine B, and then once the worm is running on machine B, it attacks the 
OLSR process on machine A. Now, after the worm takes over nr 101 s rd, sometimes it 
takes over the next OLSR process so fast it doesn't have time to update its routing table and 
remove the previously infected machine from it. So after the worm has exploited machine A, 
it still sees machine B in the routing table. We then see the alert that machine A is sending 
shellcode to machine B again. We get one final alert that machine B is sending shellcode to 
machine A. This is because it returns the previous packet containing shellcode with an error 
that the port is closed. 
The CPU usage monitoring tool always catches the process name change from 
nr l o l s rd to sh. It is possible that the tool will not catch the increased CPU usage though, 
because the statistic is only updated once every one hundredth of a second, which is the most 
frequent setting top supports. Although during our testing, we usually saw one to two 
alerts, showing a CPU usage from 30% to 99%. The tool outputs the alert to the screen, but 
the output could easily be rerouted to a file. 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 Discussion 
The system described is useful because it has a few key features that are important in 
wireless intrusion detection systems. First, our system can be distributed. This way each 
node in the network can be covered. Since wireless attacks can be directed toward any node 
within range of a transmitter, it is important to have detection on each node in the network. 
Kismet and Snort can be run on each machine in the network, or if processing power is 
limited, a Kismet drone could be setup to listen on each machine and report to a more 
powerful centralized server where Snort could check for intrusions. The CPU tool would 
also need to be run on each machine, and it could be made to send input to a centralized 
server or distribute the information to other nodes around it. 
It is possible to have Snort directly monitor the interface that packets are coming 
through, so at first it may seem like a bad idea to use Kismet to capture the packets from the 
network, but there are several reasons for this. First, as mentioned previously, Kismet does 
detect thirteen different wireless attacks. Snort will not be able to detect all of these types of 
attacks, so it is useful to run the traffic through Kismet first. Second, this combination of 
Kismet and Snort could be used to channel hop and inspect packets in range of the antenna. 
Also, using multiple Kismet drones, the captured packets could be sent to one machine, and 
that one machine could be running Snort, instead of requiring every node on the network to 
have Snort directly monitor the packets coming in through the network interface. 
The CPU tool we developed is very basic. It could be extended to monitor multiple 
processes as well as other statistics such as hard drive and memory use. It could also be 
improved to use anomaly based detection for processes with a more complicated CPU usage 
profile. 
The CPU tool, along with Kismet and Snort provide some multilevel intrusion 
detection capabilities. Kismet is able to check for wireless network attacks, Snort is able to 
watch for packet-based attacks including attacks that may affect the application layer, such as 
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buffer overflows, and the CPU tool can monitor CPU usage and watch process names. The 
CPU could possibly detect sleep deprivation attacks, if the node is using more processing 
power than normal. Correlating the alerts that each tool generate would lead to a multilevel 
intrusion detection system that would be much more powerful, able to detect more intrusions 
than systems relying on just one level of detection. 
This system can also be extended using other third party software. For example, 
commercial hardware such as TippingPoint [ 16] could be used to scan the incoming traffic 
for intrusions before handing the traffic to Snort. A web-based alert console could be 
installed for the output from Kismet, Snort, the CPU tool, and TippingPoint. Software such 
as ACID [ 17], or the newer BASE [ 1 S], can make alerts viewable using a browser that 
supports PHP. This helps increase the usability of the system. 
The system could also be cooperative. The results from local intrusion detection 
systems could be combined into a chunk of composite data and transmitted to nearby nodes 
on the network. The nodes on the network could compare the composite data with the data 
from their own tools in order to increase the likelihood of catching an intrusion. For 
example, Kismet could catch a deauthentication attack on one of its neighbors and forward 
the alert to the neighbor node. The node could then check to see if the alert matches what 
happened on that machine and take action accordingly. 
This leads into a different direction for this system: intrusion response. If these alerts 
and data correlations could be used to respond to intrusions, it would be even better. For 
example, if a machine noticed that the process name had switched to sh, the machine could 
block the ports being used by that program until an administrator could figure out what was 
going on. Packets could also be dropped based on the source address of the packet, e.g. 
MAC filters. If Kismet detected some type of wireless attack against a machine, it could 
send the data to that machine, and it could take one of those actions as well. 
Another type of possible response would be to crash the attacker's software. As we 
mentioned in the beginning of the paper, some combinations of operating systems and 
802.1 lb implementations are vulnerable to a DoS attack. If Kismet detected some kind of 
scanning software, such as NetStumbler, being used on the network, a response system could 
then decide to send the DoS packet to the machine using the software in order to prevent 
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further attacks. Responses that include attacking other machines should be very carefully 
considered before implemented, because there could be a way to force the response system to 
attack innocent users. For example, if someone sent out a probe packet with a spoofed 
source address and the response system attacked the spoofed address instead of the address 
where the attack really came from, there could be severe consequences. 
It is important to understand that the testing, results and discussion so far have only 
applied to this specific setup of using Snort, Kismet, and our CPU usage tool to detect a 
worm using buffer overflows to propagate in a wireless network. However, we have 
developed more than just an IDS that is useful in only one case. Our system can be 
generalized into a broader framework that can be applied to different types of situations. We 
are contributing a framework that allows for multiple sensors to work together and correlate 
their data using different types of detection methods across different levels in order to 
produce a comprehensive wireless IDS. 
As an example, we will discuss another situation where our framework could be used. 
Let us consider a wireless network using WEP encryption. If the network is using a 128-bit 
key, then it may appear to be pretty secure. However, in reality, it is still quite vulnerable to 
attack. Using the Aircrack suite of tools [19] including airodump-ng, aireplay-ng, 
and aircraCk-ng, we were able to crack the 128-bit WEP in less than ten minutes. 
First, we used airodump-ng to monitor and capture the packets being transmitted 
by computers on the wireless network using WEP encryption. Now, if there isn't much 
activity on the network, it can take days to collect enough initialization vectors (IVs) to crack 
the WEP key. This is where aireplay-ng comes in; aireplay-ng can be used to 
deauthenticate nodes from the target network. After a node has been deauthenticated, it 
usually attempts to reconnect. After it is associated with the network once more, it will often 
send out an address resolution protocol (ARP) request, which can be captured by 
a i rep 1 ay- ng. Once a i r ep 1 ay- ng has captured an ARP request, it can replay that 
message into the network repeatedly, which causes the number of IVs captured per minute to 
skyrocket. It takes about 100,000 to 200,000 IVs to crack a 64-bit WEP key, and it requires 
about 200,000 to 700,000 IVs to crack a 128-bit key. Using replay attacks, this many IVs 
can be collected in less than an hour easily. 
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Unfortunately, we couldn't get our hardware to work with aireplay-ng. So we 
implemented what appeared to be a busy network. We used one access point using a 128-bit 
WEP key and one associated node. We had the associated node download the latest image of 
Fedora Core from a website at a rate of about 350 KB/s. Using airodump-ng and 
aircrack-ng, we were able to obtain the 128-bit WEP key in about seven and a half 
minutes, before the download even finished. The point of this information is not to show that 
WEP is insecure; instead, it is to show that attackers may be able to compromise a network 
without the administrators knowing it. The attack we used was passive: we waited and 
collected packets until we had enough IVs to crack the WEP key. This won't be detected. 
After the attackers have gained access to the network, they may capture packets and decrypt 
them in real-time, which may allow them to capture any user~ames or passwords transmitted 
in plaintext, such as those transmitted when someone is using telnet or FTP. From there, 
using the collected usernames and passwords, the attacker can begin to compromise 
individual systems. Spyware, trojan horses, keyloggers, or even worms could be uploaded 
and executed on the compromised machines. 
However, using the framework we developed, it is possible that this type of attack 
may be detected. Sensors watching wireless traffic probably won't catch the attacker 
passively capturing packets and breaking the WEP key. However, the attacker will be 
detected when he/she begins to log in to machines and upload malicious software. For 
example, the sensors used in the framework could include machine learning, data mining, or 
anomaly-based detection methods. They will notice that a user is creating or accessing files 
that they do not have privileges to create or access, because this is anomalous behavior that 
isn't allowed. This data can also be correlated between the sensors in order to build a more 
reliable and accurate picture of what is happening in the network. In this way, multiple 
sensors used in multiple levels can be used to detect attacks they may be missed otherwise. 
So it is easy to see how our framework can be extended and modified to be useful in many 
different cases. 
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6.2 Conclusion 
We have surveyed many different available commercial and open-source wireless 
intrusion detection systems; we also studied different research papers on wireless intrusion 
detection systems. We have presented our design, tool implementation, and testing results of 
a wireless IDS. We have found Kismet to be a good tool to use in conjunction with more 
traditional intrusion detection software such as Snort. 
We have shown that our system is able to detect the worm we developed and released 
into the network. The IDS we developed is augmented by the custom tool we designed to 
monitor the CPU usage and process name of the OLSR application. Using all of these tools 
together our system can be classified as a multilevel IDS . 
At least part of our IDS should be run on every machine. At the very least, a Kismet 
drone and the CPU usage monitoring tool should be run on every machine in the network to 
capture multilevel host-based data. If the IDS needs to be managed at a centralized server, a 
Kismet server can be setup to receive data from the drones and transmit the data to Snort. If 
the IDS needs to be completely distributed, then a Kismet server can be installed and run on 
each host, and Snort can also process the incoming network data on each host along with our 
monitoring tool. It is also important to remember that this type of system is extensible. 
Third-party software can be used to extend its alert reporting and scanning capabilities. 
6.3 Future work 
As we mentioned a few times throughout this paper, the eventual goal is to design a 
host-based, distributed; cooperative, multilevel, and anomaly-based intrusion detection 
system. The system we designed could use improvements in anomaly detection, cooperative 
algorithms, and alert correlation. Anomaly detection is currently being looked into, and it 
may be possible to integrate support vector machines (SVM) into the detection process using 
software such as SVM-Light [20]. It could be used to monitor the packets received and sent 
as well as the processes running on the machine. Cooperative algorithms could be 
implemented to correlate data from nearby nodes in the network. Data shared among nodes 
would include anything gathered by the host, which could be statistics like CPU usage or 
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network data. Using data from neighbors increases the complexity of the system quite a bit, 
and then there is a chance the vulnerabilities in a cooperative algorithm may be exploited by 
an attacker. Nevertheless, it is still worth researching, because it would allow the IDS to 
reach stronger conclusions about any anomalies it finds. 
We have not done much research into making our intrusion detection system 
cooperative yet. The most robust system would be adept at correlating data between each 
layer of detection at a local level and then sharing and correlating that data with data from 
nearby nodes. This would help catch a wider range of attacks and the accuracy is improved 
when using anomaly-based detection if the detection system has access to more data. 
Multilevel intrusion detection systems are becoming more important as the possibility 
of cross-layer attacks increases [21 ] . Finding out if there are some cross-layer attacks that 
can only be detected by a multilevel IDS is a possible research avenue to pursue. If there are 
attacks such as these, then a multilevel IDS will be necessary in almost every network. 
This paper briefly discussed intrusion response mechanisms, which have only been 
considered, not implemented. Potential responses to intrusions depend on the type of attack 
but could include terminating connections, rebooting machines, deauthenticating nodes from 
a network, closing ports, attacking an intruder, MAC filtering, fake probe responses, and 
quarantining, to name a few. These methods could be further investigated and implemented, 
to be available for use at the appropriate time as determined by the intrusion detection 
system. 
There are also many improvements that could be made to the worm that we used to 
test the intrusion detection system. Specifically, to better test the IDS, it would be a good 
idea to look into implementing improved invisibility techniques as well as polymorphism and 
metamorphism. If the worm was able to keep process names the same when it infected the 
machine, then that would defeat half of the tool we developed. If there was another way to 
reduce the CPU usage of the worm somehow, that would also make it more difficult to detect 
the worm using our tool. Defeating Snort would be more difficult because it can search for a 
wide range of custom-defined rules. A polymorphic worm could be developed; it is even 
possible to design polymorphic shellcode. For example, using 2 byte instructions that do 
nothing when taken together such as adding and subtracting one from a register can be made 
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to construct a NOP sled without actually using NOPs. In this case it would be more difficult 
to get the worm to work, but it would also be more difficult to detect it. In order to detect a 
worm without a NOP sled of NOPs, Snort's rules would have to be modified. Other patterns 
would have to be found and included in Snort's rule sets in order to detect the worm. 
Developing a metamorphic engine for the worm would also make it more difficult to detect. 
The CPU tool could be improved to use anomaly detection. For example, it could 
build a normal profile of a process and use that to monitor its behavior. It would be a lot 
more accurate in determining whether or not the program is behaving erratically than just 
checking whether or not the program exceeds a certain threshold, as the tool does now. It 
could also be improved to monitor other statistics than just CPU usage and process names. It 
could be improved to monitor hard disk usage, physical memory usage, system calls, and 
other characteristics of programs. 
Kismet supports a good number of different wireless attacks, but the more attacks a 
tool is able to detect, the better. Research into developing a way to enhance Kismet to detect 
more types of malicious activity on a wireless network would lead to better overall 
performance in the intrusion detection system. If there was an alternative to Kismet that had 
as many useful features and could detect more attacks, then that alternative would be just as 
good. One possible alternative may be Snort-Wireless [22], which isn't associated with the 
developers of Snort, but it does use the Snort engine. The idea is to use Snort's rule sets in a 
wireless environment; Snort-Wireless has the ability to add rules to detect wireless attacks. 
At the time this paper is being written, the Snort-Wireless website has not been updated 
recently so the program may not be an option. 
There is still much to research regarding wireless intrusion detection systems and 
methods of testing them. Any of the places mentioned above would be a great place to 
continue to build upon existing research in order to develop a better wireless intrusion 
detection system. 
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